Recent theory posits a new corporate governance channel available to blockholders: the threat of exit. Threats, however, are distinct from actual exits and thus difficult to measure directly. This paper exploits financial crises as natural experiments that exogenously changed stock liquidity and thus the credibility of blockholder exit threats. During these crises, firms with larger blockholder ownership suffered larger declines in firm value, attesting to the governance role of exit threats. Additional tests distinguish this governance role from traditional blockholder monitoring through intervention. * We are especially grateful to the editors and the referee. We also thank Anat Admati, Lauren Cohen, Alex Edmans, Ron Masulis and workshop participants at
Introduction
Information relevant to firm prospects is typically present in myriad forms and sources and therefore costly to collect and analyze. Modern theories (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) use this fact to prove that prices cannot incorporate all relevant information because only some traders collect costly information. Corporate finance explores a specific class of such traders, namely blockholders. Because blockholders typically have significant cash flow and control rights in the firm, they have more incentives than atomistic shareholders to expend resources to collect, analyze, and act on costly information. In particular, blockholders can use this information to intervene and change management behavior (e.g., Admati et al. 1994 ). However, a recent set of analytical models suggests that blockholders can put this information to another use: they can exit when the information indicates poor firm prospects (Admati and Pfleiderer 2009 , Edmans 2009 , Edmans and Manso 2011 . Such exit exerts downward pressure on prices, which hurts management through its equity interest in the firm. Management therefore wants to make sure its actions are such that blockholders are happy to stay with the firm. The threat of blockholder exit is thus another channel through which blockholders discipline management. This paper is a first attempt to empirically test blockholder exit threats and distinguish them from other blockholder monitoring mechanisms. The key empirical difficulty is directly measuring exit threats, for they are the not the same as actual exits. In fact, a situation with no exits could be the one where the threat of exit is most effectively deployed. Empirically, therefore, testing exit threat models require a clear and convincing measurement of blockholders' threat of exit.
Our identification strategy rests on the observation that the credibility of blockholder exit threats rests crucially on blockholders' beliefs that they can exit without incurring severe losses. That is, blockholders' expectations of future liquidity are critical for exit threat models to work. In the models, blockholder beliefs can be analytically computed, but any empirical estimates of liquidity beliefs are subject to question. We therefore bypass the computation of liquidity measures entirely, appealing instead to exogenous liquidity shocks triggered by foreign financial crises. Specifically, we examine the Russian default crisis and the Asian financial crisis. These were unexpected exogenous events (from an individual firm's perspective) whose duration was unknown at the time of the onset. A significant body of studies indicate that these events significantly decreased liquidity in the U.S. stock market (Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Chordia et al. 2005) , suggesting that, on average, U.S. stock market participants including blockholders likely revised their expectations of future liquidity downwards. Furthermore, because the sources of the above two shocks were abroad, we have some confidence in asserting that their impact on the U.S. stock market was primarily through liquidity. Consequently, these crises are a natural experiment to test the credibility and power of blockholder exit threats. Our main empirical tests therefore examine how the association between firm value (Q) and block holdings shifts around these exogenous liquidity shocks. We find that firms with larger block ownership were impacted significantly more during these crises, with a one standard deviation increase in block ownership corresponding to a decrease of about 0.05 in Q. This is an economically large effect, given Q's sample mean(σ) 1.9(1.4). Block exit threats thus appear to be strongly operating in our sample.
1
We then turn to domestic events. First, we conduct the same analysis for the recent U.S. financial crisis. The economic impact of this crisis on our sample of U.S. firms extended far beyond just liquidity shocks; the accompanying collapse of the housing sector and the economic downturn also adversely affected firms' fundamentals (e.g., demand for their products). It is therefore difficult to attribute Q-based results around the U.S. financial crisis to just liquidity effects. Not surprisingly therefore, when we perform similar tests for the US liquidity crisis episode, we find mixed results.
Our last candidate for an exogenous liquidity shock is decimalization in early 2001, when the New York Stock Exchange (and Nasdaq shortly afterwards) started quoting and trading its listed issues in dollars and cents (decimalization) as opposed to increments of a sixteenth of a dollar. However, unlike the crises, this event was anticipated, so from a fully rational agent perspective, it somewhat more difficult to make the case that blockholder expectations of future liquidity increased post-decimalization. In addition, the post-decimalization liquidity impact was also heterogenous across firms (Bessembinder 2003) . Nonetheless, we find a significant larger increase in firm value post-decimalization for those firms with large block holdings. The economic magnitude is also significant, with a one standard deviation increase in block ownership corresponding to a increase of about 0.048 in Q (the Q's sample mean(σ) 1.9(1.4)).
To further demonstrate that the above results are consistent with the predictions of the blockholder exit threat models, we run a falsification test by constructing periods of "pseudoshocks" to denote periods of equal length before and adjacent to the actual liquidity shocks.
We do not find any analogous significant effects around "pseudo-shocks", lending further confidence to our interpretation that the effect of liquidity on the association between firm value and block ownership is due to exit threats.
We next directly investigate the channels through which the possibility of blockholder exit disciplines managers. In Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009) , and Edmans and Manso (2011), managers continue to hold equity in the firm, and suffer the full negative price impact of blockholder exit and public disclosure of this exit. Thus, these models predict that blockholder exit threat will be more effective in firms whose manager's wealth is more sensitive to the stock price. Accordingly, we find that the impact of liquidity shocks on the blockholder-firm value association is far more pronounced for firms whose managers have significant equity exposure.
Finally, we distinguish the threat of exit from traditional monitoring activities such as intervention or voice. We first find that incorporating measures of management immunity to intervention and voice have no impact on our findings, suggesting that our findings represent a different governance channel. Admati and Pfleiderer (2009, Section 7) propose two additional distinguishing empirical implications of blockholder governance via exit threats. First, noting that blockholder exit threats hinge crucially on management exposure to stock price and liquidity (whereas blockholder ability to intervene should not depend on the combination of these two factors), Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) suggest that abnormal returns to the announcements of block purchases should be larger for those firms that are more liquid and whose managers are more heavily compensated on equity. This is exactly what we find, suggesting investors recognize the disciplining value of exit threats.
2 The second implication is that the effectiveness of exit threats lies not as much in promoting good investments as it does in deterring bad investments (by contrast, blockholder intervention should be equally effective in both cases). Admati and Pfleiderer (2009, Section 7) suggest that the "bad" agency problem is more severe in cash-rich firms. Accordingly, we find that our liquidity shock results hold significantly more strongly for cash-rich firms, suggesting that governance via exit is distinct from governance via monitoring.
Section 2 reviews the theory and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, while Sections 4 through 6 discuss the results. Section 7 concludes by placing our findings in the literature.
Theory and Hypotheses

Analytical models
Traditional models of liquidity and blockholder corporate governance focused primarily on blockholder behavior. Some studies argued that liquidity helps an investor build up a large block position with a small movement in the price (Maug 1998; Kahn and Winton 1998) .
Having acquired the block, the blockholder has incentives to increase the value of his stake by monitoring management behavior and intervening if necessary. Liquidity thus enhances governance. Other studies argue this is not necessarily true: Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993) argue that greater stock liquidity makes it easier for the large shareholder who is discontented with the manager's actions to sell his stake (commonly known as the "Wall Street Rule" or the "Wall Street Walk"). Liquidity promotes exit, thus impairing governance. However, these studies did not highlight the impact such exit would have on the manager.
The impact of exit on managers was undertaken by a new set of models (Admati and Pfleiderer 2009 , Edmans 2009 , Edmans and Manso 2011 . Observing that management has equity interest in the firm through compensation practices, these studies make the link from blockholder exit to management via price. Blockholder exit lowers price which hurts the value of management's equity interest in the firm. Management will therefore try to prevent exit. Thus the threat of exit disciplines management.
Modeling the price impact of blockholder exit in rational markets requires careful attention to a) the blockholder information and actions sets, b) the price discovery mechanism, and c) the management's reaction. As stated in the first paragraph of this paper, all the exit threat models assume that blockholders invest in acquiring value-relevant information that is not freely available to atomistic investors and is not reflected in current prices. 3 However, the market knows the presence of blockholders because of their Schedule 13D filings (Admati and Plfeiderer 2009, footnote 23) . As a result, prices will respond to subsequent blockholder actions.
Blockholders' subsequent rational action in exit threat models turns out to be exit if the information they collect is sufficiently pessimistic. Liquidity is key here because it enables blockholders to sell their shares without suffering very large capital losses. This feature is particularly important for Edmans and Manso (2011) where the threat of exit arises from competition among multiple blockholders, all of whom rush to exit first upon receiving bad news. Blockholder expectations of liquidity are thus critical to the functioning of the exit option.
The effect on management, however, is more nuanced. Blockholder exit has a disciplining effect on management only if there is a price impact on exit. Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2011) explicitly derive the price in a rational expectations model where blockholders trades are anonymously mixed with noise trades. Because such models have finite liquidity, the magnitude of price impact is material enough for management, but small enough to induce exit by blockholders. In addition, higher liquidity induces blockholders to collect more costly information and build larger blocks in the first place, because exit is easier in more liquid markets. So higher liquidity situations still cause price impact on management due to larger block trades. In addition to price impact via trading, Pfleiderer (2009, p. 2672 ) note that at a later date, investors may receive information about the blockholder exit itself. This disclosure has an additional impact on price that is borne by management but not by the exiting blockholder. In sum, therefore, liquidity facilitates blockholder exit while reducing the value of the management's equity interest in the firm.
An important observation about the structure of the exit threat models is that the information asymmetry arising from blockholders' investment in costly information is temporary.
All models posit a future "liquidation period" where all information is revealed (e.g., through periodic accounting disclosures). The exit threat is successful only to the extent the manage-ment has a compensation/ownership interest in the interim price (and not the liquidation value Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) show that exit threats are much more effective in preventing management from undertaking "bad" projects than in persuading management to undertake "good" projects. The rationale once again lies in the specific details of the process through which stock prices respond to blockholder trades in each situation, but the overall intuition is that the market interprets abnormal sales volume far more pessimistically in the "bad" case than in the "good" case, i.e., in equilibrium, the market in the "bad case" is more aggressive in concluding that abnormal sales reflect blockholder exit due to management's decision to invest in highly negative NPV projects. As a result, management compensated on interim price is extra-vigilant in the "bad" case setting to prevent blockholder exit. This result, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) argue, distinguishes exit threats from blockholder intervention activities, which should be symmetrically effective in controlling both "good" and "bad" agency problems.
Empirical predictions
The above price, compensation, and investment dynamics suggest several empirical strategies to test exit threat models and distinguish them from traditional intervention models of blockholder governance. Clearly, because the credibility of exit threats hinge on liquidity, modeling expectations of future liquidity is key to estimating these models. Approaching this issue directly in a structural model is difficult not just because of the empirical hurdles in measuring these expectations, but also because any structural model has to account for the endogenous nature of block ownership, which in itself is a very difficult problem. For example, block owners in some firms may have accrued high levels of unrealized capital gains and thus may be less motivated to monitor. Any structural model would have to account for these cross-sectional differences.
The innovation in our paper is to recognize that the central prediction of the above models, namely that the threat of exit is less credible when blockholder expectations of stock liquidity is lower, does not require a full-fledged structural model. Instead, one can follow the Angrist and Krueger (2001, pp. 73) natural experiment approach where one measures the change in the association between two variables after the "independent" variable experiences an exogenous shock. The key assumption here is that this exogenous shock does not change the underlying structural model. As as a result, any change in the association between the two variables can be interpreted in causal terms.
As detailed in the next section, we use three shocks to liquidity whose origins appear exogenous to any individual firm. These shocks are: the Russian default crisis during 1998, and the Asian financial crisis during 1997, and the decimalization of the minimum tick size in the U.S. in 2001. Our idea is that these events likely caused an exogenous change in blockholders' expectations of their ability to exit in the future. It is well recognized in the literature that the benefits of blockholder disciplining should result in higher firm value, especially when block ownership information is public (e.g., Laeven and Levine 2008) . 4 We therefore examine how the association between firm value (dependent variable) and block ownership (independent variable) responds to an exogenous and publicly visible liquidity shock. Specifically, we predict that the correlation between firm value and block ownership decreases during the Russian and Asian crises and increases post-decimalization.
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Next, as Angrist and Krueger (2001, p. 78) note, the response to the shock is likely to be heterogeneous across the treatment firms, which the empirical researcher can use to conduct additional cross-sectional variation or comparative statics tests. First, we check if the effect of 4 See Section 6 of this paper for further elaboration of this point. 5 Our assumption therefore is that the main effect of the liquidity shock is on the credibility of blockholder exit threats and not on other blockholder governance skills. This appears an entirely reasonable assumption. As Brav et al. (2008) note, other monitoring techniques such as activism and intervention require skill and talent that can only be built over time; a liquidity shock is unlikely to impact these skills or their marginal impact in a material way. the crises was stronger for firms that experienced a larger shock to liquidity. Our rationale here is that ex post changes to liquidity are proxies for ex ante changes in blockholder expectations of future liquidity. To do so, we dig deeper into the theoretical models to identify the key mechanisms that drive the link between stock liquidity and blockholder exitbased disciplining. One such key mechanism in the Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2011) models is managerial exposure to short-run stock price. While managerial exposure to stock price can take several forms, e.g., the possibility of job loss and takeover threats (e.g., Edmans et al. 2011), we follow the exit threat models and focus on one concrete and clearly measurable factor, namely the management's stockbased compensation. Specifically, we examine whether the exogenous shocks to blockholder disciplining are felt more severely for firms where the management's delta (compensation sensitivity to stock price) is higher.
Finally, as discussed in the Section 2.1, we distinguish exit threat theories from blockholder intervention theories based on the recommendations of Admati and Pfleiderer (2009, Section 7). We first check if investors react more strongly to blockholder purchases when management is more sensitive to stock price. Second, we also test if our main tests hold more strongly for cash-rich firms who are more susceptible to the "bad" agency problem of management undertaking unprofitable investments for personal perquisites. These linkages, while natural in exit threat theories, have no place in traditional intervention-based governance theories.
Sample and Variable Definitions 3.1 Exogenous liquidity shocks
We first locate settings that, from an individual firm's perspective were exogenous, unanticipated, severe and of uncertain duration, and decreased liquidity. Financial crises are natural candidates, but we have to be careful to ensure that the primary impact of the crisis on our sample firms was a liquidity shock. The current U.S. financial crisis does not meet this criterion because its economic impact on our sample of U.S. firms was far more than just liquidity effects. 6 We therefore look to foreign crises. The effect of these crises on our sample of U.S. firms are primarily liquidity shocks transmitted through international capital markets, as opposed to shocks to operating fundamentals. Our first candidate is the Russian default crisis. On August 17, 1998, the Russian government and the Central Bank of Russia issued a statement effectively declaring that Russia was forced to default on some of its short-term sovereign debt, devalue its currency, and declare a suspension of payments by commercial banks to foreign creditors (Desai 2000). Declining productivity, an artificially high fixed exchange rate between the ruble and foreign currencies to avoid public turmoil, and a chronic fiscal deficit were the background to the meltdown. The inability of the Russian government to implement a coherent set of economic reforms led to a severe erosion in investor confidence and a chain-reaction that led to investors fleeing the financial markets.
Studies such as Acharya and Pedersen (2005) It is for the same reason we cannot use firm-specific shocks to liquidity. Events that drive these shocks, e.g., expanded investor recognition and analyst following or inclusion in an index, do not occur randomly but are triggered by changes in firm fundamentals (e.g., Denis et al. (2003) ).
7 This clearly implies that the shock was not perceived as fleeting or insignificant.
decrease in stock liquidity during the Asian financial crisis. We denote the period from July 1997 to December 1997 as the Asian crisis, and use it as another period where blockholder expectations of future liquidity declined.
Our final candidate for an exogenous change in liquidity is early 2001, when U.S. stock and option markets began quoting prices in decimal increments rather than fractions of a dollar. At the same time, the minimum price increment (or tick size) was reduced to a penny on the stock markets. While New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) replaced the system of fractional pricing on January 29, 2001, the Nasdaq Stock Market decimalized shortly thereafter, on April 9, 2001. Given that this event was pre-announced, we acknowledge that it is more difficult to claim that blockholder expectations of liquidity went up postdecimalization, especially if these blockholders were fully rational ex ante. Nonetheless, we use the decimalization as a confirmatory natural experiment to the crises.
Data
Our sample period is 1996 to 2002. We use blockholder data from two public sources. 
Variable definitions
Our measure of firm value is Tobin's Q (Q). We define Q as the ratio of market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, both computed at the end of each fiscal year.
There is no single accepted measure of block ownership in the literature. Following
Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2011) who argue that both the block ownership levels and the number of blockholders matter for "threat of exit" models (also see Laeven and Levine (2008)), our constructs of blockholder ownership measure the share of all block owners, the share of the largest block owner, and the number of block owners. We also combine the total block ownership and the number of block owners into a single measure (Block Ownership ) using the first principal component of the common variation, computed each fiscal year. While these measures are highly correlated, each is likely to measure a different facet of block ownership and finding consistent results across all these measures will increase the confidence in our results. Note that management can also be blockholders, and the models we test pertain to non-management blockholders. In our construction of block ownership measures, we therefore exclude management.
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Our control variables are motivated by Laeven and Levine (2008) . These include firm size defined as the log of market value of equity (Size). Growth is measured by annual percentage change in sales (Growth). The investment ratio is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (Capex ). Asset tangibility is measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets to measure asset tangibility (Fixed Assets). Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Finally, we include two additional ownership measures.
First, we define an indicator variable (Majority) that denotes whether or not the largest of all reported blockholders holds more than 50%. Second, we define an indicator variable (Wide)
to denote widely-held ownership defined as firms where no reported blockholder holds more than 10%. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix 1. 12 Our regression specification ensures that the included year fixed effects are not collinear with indicators for liquidity shocks. and the Asian financial crisis respectively. In particular, Russian is set to 1 for fiscalyear ends between August 1998 and December 1998, while Asian takes the value of 1 for fiscal year-ends between July 1997 and December 1997. Table 2 , Panel A indicates that the periods during the two crises saw a significantly weakened association between block ownership and firm value, as predicted. In seven out of the eight specifications we employ the interaction term Block * Crisis is negative and significant at the 10% level or stronger, with the only insignificant result being the number of blockholders for the Russian crisis.
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The economic magnitude is also large, with a one standard deviation increase in total block ownership corresponding to a decrease of about 0.05 in Q. This is an economically large effect, given Q's sample mean(σ) 1.9(1.4). We also include the level of block ownership in all our specifications to control for the direct effect as well.
In interpreting the regression in Table 2 , Panel A, our maintained assumption is that crises were exogenous shocks to liquidity and not to the overall structural model of block ownership.
Consistent with this assumption, we find (in unreported tests) no significant changes in block ownership measures around the Russian and Asian crises. Overall, therefore, the force of the interactive effect is coming from the exogenous liquidity shock. Also note the presence of firm fixed-effects, which imply that the results represent the average "within-firm" impact when the crises hit, not an "across-firm" impact.
We follow up with the decimalization test in Table 2 , Panel B. We find that for all four measures of block ownership, the relation between block ownership and firm value is significantly more pronounced in the post-decimalization period (the interaction term Block * Decimalization is positive and significant at the 1% level or higher in all the four specifications). The economic magnitude is also large, with a one standard deviation increase in total block ownership corresponding to a increase of about 0.06 in Q. This is an economically large effect, given Q's sample mean(σ) 1.9(1.4).
14 13 Recall that the number of blockholders is motivated by Edmans and Manso (2011), who argue that larger numbers of blockholders are more likely to fall into "rush to exit" competitions, thus multiplying the threat the exit.
14 Unlike the crises which ended after some time, decimalization is permanent. In this sense, the decimalization event is unbalanced: our panel has two years post-decimalization, but five years pre-decimalization. As an alternative specification, we balance the panel in event time by restricting the sample to the years 1999 -2002. The decimalization results continue to hold, lending further credence to the robustness of the tests.
Falsification tests
In sum, therefore the results in Table 2 strongly indicate that the threat of exit is a powerful governance mechanism available to blockholders. To further reinforce this inference, we create "pseudo-shocks" periods and examine whether the relation between block ownership and firm value changes substantially during these periods. We define three indicator variables as representing the six-month period prior to Decimalization, Russian Crisis, and Asian Crisis periods. We examine how the association between firm value and total block ownership changes in these "pseudo-shock" periods. Given the placebo nature of this test, we do not expect to find any significant results. The results, in Table 3 , show that the coefficients of all three interaction terms of the block ownership variable with the three pseudo experiments are insignificant, suggesting no difference in the relation between total block ownership and firm value between regular periods and "pseudo-shock" periods. Thus, our three original events capture exogenous shocks to stock liquidity and are not mere manifestations of time-trends in stock liquidity or other spurious temporal factors.
Tests of liquidity expectations
Our premise thus far has been that the Russian and Asian crises lowered expectations of future liquidity for blockholders on average in the sample. However, we recognize that there will be some within-sample variation in these expectations changes. While the analytical models have explicit functional forms for these expectations, empirically estimating the crosssection variation in these expectations directly is challenging. In unreported tests, we proxy for changes in blockholder expectations of future liquidity directly by measuring the difference between the firm's liquidity in the next fiscal year and the firm's liquidity in the current fiscal year.
15 Regressing Q on the triple interaction effect of block ownership measures and crises indicators and future liquidity changes, we find mixed results (we separate the positive from the negative liquidity changes in the triple interactions). At the first glance, there thus appears to be no cross-sectional variation in exit threats during the crises.
However, an important point to recognize is that ex post future changes in liquidity could 15 Our measure of annual liquidity is the log of Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity times −1, where the Amihud measure is computed as the annual average of the monthly ratio of unsigned stock returns to dollar trading volume.
be highly inadequate a proxy for changes in ex ante expectations of future liquidity. As an alternative, we posit that large firms, which already have low levels of information asymmetry in the capital markets, are ex ante less likely to be affected by the liquidity crises. That is, shares in large firms should still continue to be liquid when the crisis hits.
16 Crises onsets should therefore trigger smaller shocks to large firms' blockholders' ex ante expectations of future liquidity. Table 4 documents the results. Exit threats during the crisis are significantly smaller for larger firms: in fact, triangulating the coefficient from Table 4 with Table 1 , the crises impose virtually no shocks to exit threats in the largest firm in the sample. Likewise, one can argue that smaller firms, which typically have more information asymmetry, benefit more from structural improvements to market liquidity. Accordingly, Table 4 documents that the benefits of decimalization to exit threats are significantly more strong for smaller firms.
Other liquidity events
We first replicate the specification of Table 2 for the current financial crisis. Using the TED spread, we identify the liquidity crisis period as September 2007 to June 2009. Our results (unreported) are mixed. One potential explanation is that the current crisis was not just a liquidity shock but was also accompanied by the collapse of the housing sector and an economic slowdown, which direct impacted firm fundamentals (i.e., our dependent variable Q).
We next estimate a regression similar to Table 2 , with the key difference that we interact the four block ownership measures with the firm's liquidity measure for the current fiscal period. 17 This specification is thus a non-event steady-state panel regression, where the assumption is that liquidity in the current period is the blockholders' expectation for future liquidity, and identification occurs through firm fixed effects. The results (not reported)
indicate that the interactions between measures of block ownership and liquidity are highly significant at the one percent level, suggesting that the impact of block holdings on firm value is significantly higher when blockholders' expectations of liquidity are higher. However, we do not pursue this non-event estimation technique any further because of identification 16 In line with this argument, we find that the association between Q and the crises is significantly weaker for larger firms.
17 The liquidity measure is defined in footnote15.
concerns.
Finally, we examine the association between firm value and block ownership around S&P 500 additions and deletions. Albeit firm-specific and not strictly exogenous, these events significantly change the investor base and plausibly change the firm's liquidity environment.
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In unreported results, we find that these events have some weakly significant effects in mediating the association between block ownership and firm value. Similar results obtain qualitatively, if we use initiation of analyst following (again not exogenous) as a proxy for a liquidity enhancing event in the life of a firm.
Investor and Management Characteristics
Investor characteristics
All exit threat models rely on blockholders collecting costly information and deciding to exit if necessary. However, the empirical reality is that not all blockholders are sufficiently vigilant: some blockholders may themselves be subject to agency problems, others may have some nexus with management (e.g., they may be selected by management to manage pension and stock option plans), yet others may be passive (e.g., they may have bought the firm at a low cost basis and may be satisfied with their unrealized capital gains). It is therefore instructive to see which category of blockholders primarily drive our findings.
It is a difficult task for an empirical researcher to unambiguously measure blockholder intent and vigilance. For example, blockholders have to disclose their ownership intent in item 4 of 13D filings. However, any such textual disclosure is open to ambiguity and multiple interpretations, and studies that use these filings have had to exercise significant judgment in classifying intent (e.g., Brav et al. (2008, Section II) ). We therefore do not interpret the 13D filings explicitly, but simply partition our blockholders into the following two mutually exclusive categories: those who manage employee stock option plans (ESOP), or otherwise those who are directors, outsiders, and other categories. Table 5 provides the results based on blockholder type. We find that exogenous liquidity
18 However, recent research shows that S&P additions are not information-free events as had been traditionally assumed (Denis et al. (2003) ). If so, the liquidity changes around these events are no longer exogenous events and do not form a good setting to explore the efficacy of the threat of blockholder exit.
shocks both significantly impact (in the right direction) the association between firm value and director/outsider and ESOP blockholders. That is, both these type of blockholders exert significant exit threat on the firm. The lack of behavioral variation across these blockholder types is consistent with Davis and Kim (2007) , who find that mutual funds' nexus with management through pension plans only rarely make these funds acquiescent to management decisions. That is, client relationships do not significantly matter for blockholder governance activities.
Note thus far that the definition of blockholders excludes management. As an additional check, Table 4 also includes blockholders who are officers. In stark contrast to outsider blockholders, officer blockholders exert no exit threat. This should be the case because officers are on the receiving end of the exit threats made by external blockholders.
19 However, management ownership plays a different but crucial role in enabling exit threats by outside blockholders. We document this phenomenon next.
Management characteristics
The key distinguishing feature of exit threat models from the "Wall Street walk" models is the idea the threat of blockholder exit is a credible disciplinary mechanism because the actual exit depresses stock price and adversely affects the manager's equity interest in the firm. As noted by exit threat models, equity compensation is a concrete factor tying management's welfare to the interim stock price. To compute management's sensitivity to short-run (or current) stock price, we estimate the sensitivity of the CEO's equity portfolio to changes in the stock price (Delta), using the methodology in Core and Guay (2002) . We then split the sample into two based on the median Delta in each fiscal year. 20 Observations with Delta above the median are called the High group, and those below form the Low Group. Based on exit threat theory, we expect the impact of the crises on the association between firm value and block ownership to be stronger the High group than the Low group. Table 6 , Panel A, presents the results. While we report these results using the total 19 Our assumption here is that management as a group is unified. That is, one manager is not securing the cooperation of other managers by threatening to exit.
20 Some of our sample firms have no option data on Execucomp. We checked their 10-K filings to ensure they indeed had minimal option issuances. For these firms, as suggested by Core and Guay (2002), we estimated sensitivity to performance based on executive share ownership data. block ownership measure for brevity, results are similar using the other three measures as well. Each set of columns presents the results first for the high Delta group (High) and then for the low Delta group (Low ). The test for the difference between the coefficients of the interaction term across the two groups during the crises is significant with a p-value of 0.01.
As analytically predicted, the crises had a much stronger impact on the relationship between block ownership and Q for those firms whose management had a larger exposure to stock price. The economic magnitudes are also substantially different, with the high Delta group reporting an interaction effect almost nine times larger than the low Delta group. Similar results obtain for the decimalization event.
Edmans et al. (2009) The results in Table 6 , Panel B are similar to Panel A, with the impact of the crises on the high compensation group being now four times the impact on the low compensation group. In sum, therefore, exit threats are significantly more effective when management has strong equity interests. This analytically predicted association further serves to validate the relevance of exit threat models: blockholders govern through their role as informed traders who can potentially depart upon dissatisfaction with management.
Exit Threats vs. Intervention
This section explicitly differentiates exit threats from other blockholder governance activities such as intervention (or "voice"). Blockholder intervention activities comprise of many activities; we therefore try to measure the opposite, namely management's power to resist these activities. Specifically, we measure management entrenchment using the Entrenchment index (E-index) of Bebchuk et al. (2009) . This index is based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. Higher values of the E-index indicate more provisions that make it harder to replace incumbent managers, and thus likely represent a higher degree of management immunity to blockholder intervention activities.
If indeed blockholder intervention activities are distinct from exit threats, we expect our results to hold after accounting for the sample firms' E-indices.
As in Table 6 , we split our sample into two, and define Low E (High E ) as the group with below sample median (above median) takeover protection. The Low E firms are therefore less entrenched. The results, presented in Table 7 , Panel A indicate that the level of entrenchment has no significant differential effect on the efficacy of exit threats. More important, the threat of exit is significantly operational even in high entrenchment firms, where voice is silent. Thus, exit threats appear to constitute a distinct governance mechanism than voice.
To further differentiate blockholder exit threats from intervention, we follow Admati and Plfeiderer (2009, Section 7), who suggest several predictions of exit threat theories not offered by blockholder intervention theories. First, they argue that abnormal returns to block purchases should be more positive for those firms whose managers have significant exposure to current stock price and whose stock investors expect to remain liquid (so that blockholders can exit in the future if need be). That is, liquidity and compensation are complementary.
This prediction is not evident from traditional blockholder intervention theories, because blockholder ability to intervene should not directly depend on the combination of liquidity and management exposure to stock price.
We proxy for expectations of future liquidity on average by current liquidity.
22 Our measure of management exposure to current stock price is Delta and our measure of current liquidity is defined in footnote 15. Both liquidity and Delta are computed for the last fiscal year ending before the purchase announcement date. The block purchase announcement date is the Schedule 13D filing date. 
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This investor recognition has a much deeper role in our paper. Our main tests use marketbased measures such as Q as the dependent variable. Our implicit assumption throughout the paper therefore has been that investors are aware of the disciplining power of exit threats, and react accordingly as these threats wax and wane. Table 7 , Panel B is a clear confirmation of this assumption.
Finally, as described in Section 2.1, Admati and Pfeliderer (2009, Section 7) argue that blockholder exit threats are more effective at preventing "bad" agency problem of wasteful investment by management for perquisites. The authors argue that this situation is more likely in cash rich firms, and indeed, Table 7 , Panel C shows that the weakening of exit threats due the foreign crises is significantly more strongly felt in cash rich firms. The coefficients indicate that the effect is about 16 times higher in cash rich firms. This strong prediction of course is one that is not offered by intervention theories of blockholder governance: there no reason ex ante to assume such asymmetries in blockholder intervention's effectiveness at curbing "good" versus "bad" agency problems.
Conclusion
The threat of exit is central to the functioning of free markets: even in the classical competitive economy, the derivation of the optimal price for the producer relies squarely on the threat of exit by the consumer. This study finds empirical evidence that the threat of exit by blockholders is a strong governance force. This study accomplishes this task by showing that the relation between firm value becomes and block holdings becomes weaker when the blockholder exit threat becomes less credible. This study changes to the credibility of exit threats by using the natural experiment of foreign financial crises that exogenously reduced liquidity in the U.S. stock markets.
Although several recent studies link block ownership to price informativeness, liquidity, and actual blockholder exits (e.g., Boehmer and Kelley 2009; Parinno et al. 2003) , the threat of exit itself remains an under-explored topic in the empirical literature. While studies such as Fang, Noe and Tice (2009) also use natural experiment of decimalization to study liquidity effects, this paper makes several new contributions: it shows that the effect is particularly strong when block ownership is higher (providing evidence that liquidity is acting through "governance through exit" rather than other channels), it performs falsification tests, and it shows that the effect is particularly strong for equity-aligned managers (a feature also specific to exit threat theories). While most existing empirical studies of governance and blockholders focus on control rights (e.g. voting, private benefits of control, etc.,), this paper implies a different way of thinking about blockholders' role in governance, namely as informed traders for whom liquidity is particularly important. The number of non-officer blockholders holding at least 5%. Block
Ownership
Composite measure of non-officer blockholder ownership formed by combining Block T otal and Block N umber using principal components each fiscal year. Block
Largest
Ownership stake of the largest non-officer blockholder in percent. Capex Capital expenditures (data128) scaled by total assets (data6).
Crisis
Combines Asian Crisis and Russian Crisis variables. Decimalization Indicator variable denoting the decimalization period. It takes the value 1 for firmyears with fiscal year ends after January 2001. Delta Sensitivity of the CEO's own firm equity and option holdings to changes in the firm's stock price using the methodology of Core and Guay (2002).
E index The Entrenchment index of Bebchuck et al (2009). Fixed Assets
Ratio of fixed assets (data8) to total assets (data6). Growth Annual sales growth (percent change in data12). Leverage Ratio of long term debt (data9+data34) to total assets (data6). Majority Indicator variable to denote firms with more than 50% block ownership. Pseudo Experiments1-3 Indicator variables that denote pseudo experiments (which are set to a date six months before the actual event) corresponding to the Russian crisis, Asian financial crisis, and decimalization events respectively. Q Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of book value of assets (data6) minus book value of equity (data60) plus market value of equity (data25*data199) to the book value of total assets (data6). Russian Crisis Indicator variable denoting the Russian financial crisis. It takes the value 1 for firms with fiscal year ends between August 1998 and December 1998. Scaled WPS Dollar change in CEO wealth for a one percentage point change in firm value, divided by annual pay as in Edmans et al. (2009) . Size Log of (Market value of equity defined as number of shares outstanding (data25) times stock price (data199)). Wide Indicator variable to represent firms with no block owners > 10%. We examine the impact of an exogenous increase in the threat of exit post-decimalization on firm value. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. Decimalization is a dummy variable that assumes the value one for the period after January 31, 2001 and zero otherwise. All regressions contain firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors (reported within parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and firm level clustering. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix 1. * * * , * * and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. High (Low) firms are those with Entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al. (2009) ) values above (below) the sample median in any fiscal year. All regressions contain firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors (reported within parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and firm level clustering. Other control variables are included as in Table 2 , but not reported. The χ 2 and p-value pertain to the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the interaction term across the High and Low firms are equal. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix 1. * * * , * * and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is the market adjusted abnormal return CAR(0, +2) in basis points, where date 0 is the announcement of a 13D filing with the SEC when a shareholder has reached a 5% holding threshold. We obtain the dates by searching SEC EDGAR filings for our sample of firms between 1996 and 2002. Liquidity is the the log of Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity times −1, where the Amihud measure is the annual average of the monthly ratio of unsigned stock returns to dollar trading volume. Both liquidity and Delta are computed for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement date. Column (2) contains firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and firm level variables reported in Table 2 as additional controls. All standard errors (reported within parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and firm level clustering. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix 1. * * * , * * and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
(1) 
